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SUSTAINABILITY IN GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS: A MEASURE OF
PERFORMANCE FROM THE CONTRACTOR PERSPECTIVE

Tamara P. Williams
Walden University, USA

ABSTRACT
Studies in Government contracting are relatively new manifestation to academic
research. Expanding theories to practitioner challenges may offer new concepts
and insights to potential solutions to these challenges. Through a review of
relevant literature, the researcher sought to 1) identify an operational definition
of sustainability in government contracting and 2) bridge gaps in information by
exploring sustainability factors available for successful performance in
government contracting. Findings provide noteworthy contributions of practices
available to both businesses and contracting professionals designed to improve
contracting performance and enhance business longevity for government
contractors.
INTRODUCTION
The U.S. funds $450 billion annually through the discretionary budget for
government contract spending (Friel, 2014). Since the early 1990’s, sustainability has
become a business trend that changed demands placed on business. Emergence of new
developments created gaps in information germane to leadership and successfully
implementing sustainability measures in organizations (Metcalf & Benn, 2012).
Deficiencies in information mean some business leaders may be unaware of successful
sustainability strategies that increase longevity in government contracts. Consequently,
these business leaders lack knowledge in sustainability for successful performance in
government contracting. The researcher sought to 1) identify an operational definition of
sustainability in government contracting and 2) bridge gaps in information by exploring
sustainability factors available for successful performance in government contracting
through a narrative literature review. Sustainability has not been clearly defined or
consistently applied throughout business research (Carter & Rogers, 2008). Failure to
apply sustainability concepts to government contracting, integrate relationships of
concepts to contractor performance, and consistently define sustainability in business
literature lead to two questions: 1) How can sustainability be defined and applied to
government contracting? 2) Does a relationship exist between integrated sustainability
concepts, government contracting, and contractor performance?
Sustainability for organizations employs critical areas that collectively create a
systemic, strategic focus that helps foster sustainable growth for stakeholders and
agencies. Procurement definitions vary in scope in relation to supply chain management,
and terms are often industry specific. Sustainable procurement has traditionally primarily
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focused on reducing cost (Giunipero, Hooker, & Denslow, 2012). Commonly defined as,
the pursuit of sustainable development objectives through purchasing and supply chain
processes, sustainable procurement lacks a universal definition (Walker, Miemczyk,
Johnsen, & Spencer, 2012). In exploring sustainability in government contracting, the
concepts used explained and described sustainability in supply chain management
(Giunipero et al., 2012; Tate, Ellram, & Dooley, 2012). Regardless of the context applied,
sustainability is the significant aspect of organizational development that enables the
organization to promote lasting success.
Since 2012, suspension or debarment actions in US acquisitions have nearly
doubled (Lasky, 2013). Positive performance ratings and contractor performance systems
are critical for continued opportunities for firms, as the government contracting officers
seek experienced and qualified business partners to achieve its objectives (Bradshaw &
Chang, 2013). Creating performance measures has positive implications on the federal
decision makers’ capacity to manage contracts successfully (Amirkhanyan, 2011). These
factors make positive performance an imperative goal for government contractors
because a requirement for increased accountability becomes created by performance
measurement (Amirkhanyan, 2011). The information helps government officials
determine whether a contractor receives future work (Bradshaw & Chang, 2013).
Therefore, negative impacts on poor performance ratings may extend beyond the lost
revenue from government contracting opportunities.
PRINCIPAL AGENT THEORY
Jensen and Meckling’s (1976), principal-agent theory serves as the conceptual
framework to understand the impact of sustainability and government contractor
performance. The theory derives from contract law and provides a context for shaping
and managing contract interactions to expound the performances amid two actors in
agreement (Awortwi, 2012). In its application, implications are broad but the focus is on
the respective relational assignments (Steinle, Schiele, & Ernst, 2014). Supply chain
management is one example where the theory cultivates appropriate application. Scholars
have become interested in using principal-agent theory to understand how participants
manage risks, align incentives, and forge relationships (Fayezi, O’Loughlin, & Zutshi,
2012). The principal-agent theory provides evidence to explain the relationship behavior
between the principals and agents concerning managing contracts (Witesman &
Fernandez, 2013).
METHODS
To discover implications, possibilities and manifestations of sustainability in
government contracting narrative synthesis literature review is the data collection method
employed. The review comprised of information from online databases to include
ProQuest and all EBSCOhost databases. Keyword classifications identified terms
sustainability, public procurement, principal-agent relationships, government
contracting performance, sustainable leadership, and sustainable purchasing and supply
management. The article began with a review of existing literature, furthering the
conversation of the principal-agent relationship and continues with current concepts of
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sustainability, sustainable procurement, and contractor performance. The article
concludes with a discussion of findings that include recommendations for further
research, implication for professional practice and a concluding statement.
REVIEW OF LITERATURE
Contracting and Public Procurement
Government contracts, public procurement, and federal contract describe
government entities overarching premise for buying goods and services. These terms
include supply chain management aspects under the procurement. Procurement
definitions vary in scope in relation to supply chain management, and terms are often
industry specific (Miemczyk, Johnsen, & Macquet, 2012). Enhancing supply chain
perspectives produces innovative procurement techniques (Gianakis & McCue, 2012).
Procurement and sourcing decisions typically concern internal buying processes. The
processes relate primarily to direct suppliers (i.e., dyadic relationships) and include
specification, vendor selection, contracting, ordering, expediting, and evaluation
(Miemczyk et al., 2012). The literature review includes a discussion of procurement as a
supply chain subsection to understand thoroughly how sustainability factors manifest in
government contracting.
Contracting involves buying supplies and services from private contractors as an
alternative to internally providing in-house services (Awortwi, 2012). Many terms used
throughout the study are interchangeable expressions used to describe the phenomenon.
For example, purchasing as well as supply activities within dyads involve trade-offs or
transactions and long-term relationship development with other parties (Miemczyk et al.,
2012). Contracting out occurs at all levels, throughout, the federal government is a
routine practice (Lu, 2013). Theory and policy indicate that competition catalyzes
enhanced efficiency in public contracting. Government contracting officials do not
always procure supplies and service-based competition or governing policy (Joaquin &
Greitens, 2012). Awarding government contracts is often non-competitive (Johnston &
Girth, 2012). Decisions to procure supplies or services may reflect choices stemming
from individual requests or urgent needs. Agency goals and policies, combined with
contracting officials’ decision to acquire supplies or services, result in conflicting views.
Therefore, to meet established contracting goals, public procurement officials
base decisions on the need to use expedient measures (Snider, Kidalov, & Rendon, 2013).
Using convenient measures often promotes these noncompetitive awards (Johnston &
Girth, 2012). Scholars have questioned the constitutionality of relationships and
outsourcing between the government and its largest contractors such as Lockheed Martin
and Halliburton (K. N. Brown, 2011). Robust policies exist that require procurement
professionals’ adherence when making business decisions about contracting out
government goods and services. Most government outsourcing lacks systemized
accountability, and as courts and scholars begin to understand relationship
characteristics, practices will remain unchallenged (K. N. Brown, 2011).
Various collaborative efforts encompassing many elements ultimately influence
decisions and outcome of contractual agreements. Government initiatives to enter
contractual arrangements with companies whose goals align with theirs become
significant. Conversely, due to business dynamics, nonprofit and for-profit organizations
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have conflicting interests that may result in a different contractual relationship with the
government (Witesman & Fernandez, 2013). Government procurement lacks research
regarding sustainability related to organizational performance. Understanding
sustainability factors. while considering the contractual relationship between the
government and contractors within the principle-agent framework is the primary goal of
this study.
Organizational perspective
The literature reviewed included public contract performance from various
organizational aspects. These elements encompass universal meaning describing
contractual relationships germane to both the government and the contractor. Apart from
the many regulations that govern the public procurement process, an equally important
dynamic is the contracting decision makers who provide input into the contractual
relationship between the parties. As a sub category to procurement, purchasing functions
incorporate fundamental public procurement elements in organizations. To account for
the different management competencies dimension, business leaders should situate
procurement practice on an organizational level, as well as a national, context (McKevitt
et al., 2012). Significant research identified structured purchasing function and examined
how the organization's size influenced purchasing unit designs within a company (Glock
& Broens, 2013). Provider competition is difficult to achieve and costly to sustain, and
contracting decisions may not include contract management costs (Johnston & Girth,
2012). Insufficient administrative resources for efficient contracting threaten costeffective outsourcing (Johnston & Girth, 2012).
This section provided additional information and insight into sustainability and its
impact on government contracts performance. Derived information fills research
information gaps on government procurement and contributes to the body of knowledge.
Public procurement elements include management competencies, supply management,
organizational structure, and information technology (Gardenal, 2013; Gianakis &
McCue, 2012; Glock & Broens, 2013; McKevitt et al., 2012). Other significant elements
include administrative resources devoted to managing the market. Resources dedicated to
managing the market results in pitting market management objectives against contract
design, implementation, oversight, and accountability, which entails actual, often
overlooked expenditures (Johnston & Girth, 2012). In public procurement, resources
come in many forms. In addition to managing contracting markets, other organizational
aspects affect public procurement. For example, contract negotiations and final award
determinations include many factors, such as the considering the supplier’s cost structure
throughout the contract cycle (Dimitri, 2013). Additionally, management capacity may
serve as the weak link in determining efficient contracting processes (Joaquin & Greitens,
2012).
Human capital and contracting officers
Human capital is an essential element to organizations contracting processes.
Active and normative practices in public procurement have highlighted government
buyers management competencies and distinguished procurement professionals
according to their skills (McKevitt et al., 2012). German municipalities’ highlighted that
organizational size, measured by the number of inhabitants, employees, and purchasing
volume, influenced the structural variables in various ways (Glock & Broens, 2013).
Contracting officers are integral in make or buy decisions (e.g., McKevitt et al., 2012).
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Government leaders settled for provider preference and relied more heavily on vigilant
monitoring and evaluation activities (Joaquin & Greitens, 2012). A similar conclusion
indicated that agency goals and policies present conflicting views that require alignment
in an attempt to meet established contracting goals (Snider et al., 2013). This observation
substantiated Joaquin and Greitens’s (2012) finding. Even though government decision
making officials relied on oversight and monitoring, control became nearly nonexistent at
various government levels (Joaquin & Greitens, 2012).
Studies included a typology of conditions that give rise to the human elements
that can potentially create, enhance, inhibit, and sustain markets from which government
procurement officials purchase goods and services. The information revealed the theories
and governing policies behind public sector contracting needs for products and services.
However, organizational factors that influence the contracting process outside the
prevailing policies renders these principles inapplicability for practical application.
Principal-Agent Theory
The principal-agent theory originally derived from contract law and its application
to formal contractual agreements and has applicability to a variety of management
contexts (Witesman & Fernandez, 2013). Supply chain management is one example
where the theory cultivates appropriate application. Scholars have become interested in
using principal-agent theory to understand how participants manage risks, align
incentives, and forge relationships (Fayezi, O’Loughlin, & Zutshi, 2012). Supply chain
management has many aspects, and procurement is an essential element in system
operation processes. The principal-agent theory serves as an appropriate construct for
describing business leaders and managers’ behavior and performance on government
contracts within this context. The theory is
a framework for shaping and managing contract interactions to expound performance
descriptions for two actors in an agreement (Awortwi,
2012). The principal chooses an agent because the principal lacks the
expertise and resources to produce the service in-house and determines if contracting
out the services costs is advantageous. Ultimately, the principal hires an agent, and the
two parties agree to contract terms including compensation for work performed.
Principal-agent theory in public contracting
Researchers have applied the principal-agent theory to studies
involving procurement to describe broad contractual relationship scopes (Awortwi, 2012;
Etro & Cella, 2013; Tao & Jingjing, 2011). Studying behavioral choices under incentive
contracts involves analyzing monitoring capacity levels to determine value and
commission (Tao & Jingjing, 2011). The theory later became useful for examining local
governments’ effectiveness in managing relationships with private contractors in Ghana
(Awortwi, 2012). A competition analysis between research and development firms
indicated how market competition relates to incentive contract choices for managers with
hidden productivity (Etro & Cella, 2013). Although researchers have heavily applied the
theory to procurement, public procurement is a relatively new research topic and a
growing phenomenon. Therefore, the function the principal-agent theory has played to
date is relatively unknown (Flynn & Davis, 2014). Recent literature on government
contracts indicates that advantages exist to applying the principal-agent theory to
government contracting and contractor performance. An example involved identifying
a gap in research and presenting viable frameworks from which
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to investigate public procurement studies (Flynn & Davis, 2014). Many scholars applied
the principle-agent theory to government contracting and cited numerous advantages for
doing so.
Goal alignment
Principal-agent theory elements focus on determining hidden productivity costs
and encourage creative ways for principals to measure and compensate agents by
minimizing those costs to the principal (Coletta, 2013). The agency theory provides
insights for relationship engineering within supply chains, where social, political, legal,
and behavioral dynamics dominate (Fayezi et al., 2012). Politics tends to dominate preaward contract functions; however, within this arena, other dynamics affect performance
and range goals facing agencies and contractors. Examining the factors affecting goal
attainment in public sector performance contracts included a focus on Danish’s’ central
government performance contracts. The findings indicated that a crucial factor in
performance on government contracts is whether agencies control the formulating and
meeting goals (Binderkrantz, Holm, & Korsager, 2011). Therefore, to improve
contracting initiatives, a concentration should be on enabling government leaders to
secure ambitious and relevant performance objectives (Binderkrantz et al., 2011).
Researchers have explored goal alignment through rigorous contract monitoring
involving different performance aspects using numerous surveillance tools, for example,
performance objectives and measures (Witko, 2011). Performance contracts present a
solution to the goal complexity and goal ambiguity. Performance management
examinations combining incentive analysis through performance contracts with executive
contracts for agency heads revealed the systems to be ideal for focusing managerial
attention on performance (Binderkrantz & Christensen, 2012). The dynamic presented the
complex contractual relationship from the principal-agent theory perspective. Different
national contexts or other public sector organization types may reach the same
conclusions.
Manage risks and advantages of applied theory
The principal-agent theory has limitations and risks identified by authors
researching the topic. For example, an overemphasis on economic drivers has become
significant weaknesses in agency theory use (Heracleous & Lan, 2012). The underlying
premises behind the principal-agent theory must remain intact when applying to diverse
contexts, which require broadened conceptions of essential elements (Wiseman et al.,
2012). Inductive approaches used to identify context-specific differences between
principal-agent and governance structures have failed to produce principal-agent relations
with applicability to varied institutional contexts (Wiseman et al., 2012).
Forge relationships and behavior
Applying the principal-agent theory to supply chain management revealed
interdependency between the principals and the agents, who often swap roles within the
relationship (Fayezi et al., 2012). Supply chain management theories comprise an
appropriate comparison to public procurement research. Closely connected managementspecific theories are suitable for use alongside established psychological and economic
theories for studying organizations and markets (Flynn & Davis, 2014). Procurement has
become a supply chain management subfield. The subcontext is necessary because
principal-agency theory elements such as information sharing and incentivization serve to
explanation relationships and behavior contract alignment (Fayezi et al., 2012). Principal-
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agency research integrating universities as government organization support revealed
adverse selection as cynical implications materializing early in relationships (Rasmussen
& Gulbrandsen, 2012). Problems lied in finding appropriate agents for delegation
(Rasmussen & Gulbrandsen, 2012). The authors applied the theory to a program that
operated in a complex situation with multiple principals and agents. The requirement
entailed government support programs to adhere to goals and rationales for programs
funding sources and balance various stakeholders (Rasmussen & Gulbrandsen, 2012).
Conforming stakeholders’ goals as a concept align with the premise (Fayezi et al. (2012).
A corresponding principal-agent model for green supply chain management provided a
framework based on the theory (Kai, Wei, & Meng-lin, 2014). The model was suitable
for comparing and analyzing knowledge sharing characteristics between enterprises in
green supply chains. The design allowed practitioners to explore features that affected
various parameters and changed contract formation conditions. These parameters helped
identify and build upon different characteristics established by the analysis and design,
based on principal-agent theory (Kai et al., 2014). The valuable, usable framework was
suitable to analyze different management systems using the model.
Procurement officials within public organizations find it difficult to develop longterm relationships with suppliers that allow optimization in pursuing their respective
goals (Gianakis & McCue, 2012). Relational contracting relies upon a structured
agreement, which means the relationship is more than between just two parties (Never &
de Leon, 2014). Trust is crucial to ensuring all individuals will seek mutually beneficial
solutions so the relationship will continue (Never & de Leon, 2014). While the literature
indicates difficulties in forming relationships, the findings also indicated the importance
of relational contracting for successful contractual performance and completion.
Rival theories and opponents of the principal-agent theory
Numerous theories stand out for their predominant use
in public procurement research. However, two have become most prominent: the theory
of auctions and competitive bidding and principal-agency theory (Flynn & Davis, 2014).
Based on historical United States contracting regimes, relational contracting and the
stewardship model have typified classical contract law (Van Slyke, 2007). The theories
addressed significant discussion underlining contractual relationships highlighting the
similarities shared. For example, primary factors underlining the principal steward
relationship include goal congruence, mutual trust, and benefit (Witko, 2011). Within the
principal-agent theory, researchers revealed that managers frequently contacted and
communicated with their vendors despite having clear structured and formally written
contracts (Lamothe & Lamothe, 2012b). The contact may allude to the prospects that
actual contractual relationships may deviate from theories discussed.
Formal written agreements such as those drafted within the principal-agent theory
context contain influencing factors such as service characteristics, market conditions, and
vendor ownership (Lamothe & Lamothe, 2012b). These factors differ from more
relational agreements that contain the influence from management style such as
reputation, management capacity, and continuing relationships expectations (Lamothe &
Lamothe, 2012b). When discussing sustainability, the factors and activities allowed by
the principal-agent theory relationship may not permit flexibility. Primarily because
characteristics limitations exist, those are historically required to maintain such a
relationship.
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Relevant work from the contractor perspective came from authors who explored
public contracting for human services based on the impact on the contractor rather than
the government (Never & de Leon, 2014). A focus on relational contracting by Never and
de Leon (2014) involved viewing the event from the trust theoretical framework.
Viewing the relationship expanded Van Slyke’s (2007) instrumental work in examining
relationships between government agencies and contractors and contended that
relationships between public bodies and entrepreneurs often more closely resemble
principal-steward relationships. The descriptive findings indicated that government
agencies were unreliable to human service nonprofit companies that enabled the
nonprofits to adhere to predetermined contractual responsibilities (Never & de Leon,
2014). The contractor bore the burden to reduce their financial or human capital (Never
& de Leon, 2014). Goal alignment and establishing rapport become important factors for
satisfactory performance. The government’s standing and approval is a significant factor
dictating the contractor's approach to leading and managing their organization to adjust
performance to please the principal.
Sustainability
Researchers have argued favoring a positive relationship between sustainability
and financial performance because sustainability efforts improve economic benefits by
enhancing relevant organizational aspects (Lee & Pati, 2012). Information derived from
the literature analysis indicated a deficiency in universally accepted sustainability
standards or methodologies for measuring, assessing, and monitoring the company’s
progress toward sustainability. Corporate interest in sustainability results from
environmental and social scandals, government regulations, and greater consumer
concern for ecological issues (Makipere & Yip, 2008). Sustainability is measurable in at
least three ways: economic, environmental, and social. An analysis conducted by H.
Walker, Miemczyk, Johnsen, and Spencer (2012) substantiated the findings and
identified social or societal, ecological, and economic dynamics as primary sustainable
procurement and supply chain aspects.
The literature on sustainability indicates inconsistencies in sustainability and
performance, as outcome measurements surface from varying perspectives. One
investigation to identify sustainability factors related to corporate performance included
organizations whose leaders report corporate sustainability practices to examine their
impact on financial performance (Ameer & Othman, 2012). Sampling 100 top global
corporations confirmed that companies whose leaders place emphasis on sustainability
practices had higher economic performance (Ameer & Othman, 2012). Economic
performance as measured by return on assets, profit before taxation, and cash flow from
operations was comparable to companies without such commitments in some activity
sectors (Ameer & Othman, 2012). Another approach to examining corporate performance
from an economic performance perspective showed limited focus on the service industry
(Lee & Pati, 2012). Using the Pacific Sustainability Index to sample 196 companies from
12 industries ultimately exposed a direct relationship between the environmental, social
sustainability factors and market performance. The authors primarily focused
environmental and social elements, containing sub-classified aspects categorized as intent
and reporting. For example environmental intent covered accountability, management,
policy, and vision. Environmental reporting covered emissions to air, emission to water,
energy, management, materials usage, recycling, waste, water. Social intents covered
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accountability, management, policy, social demographic, and vision. Social Reporting
covers the scores of human rights, management, qualitative social, and quantifiable social
elements (Lee & Pati, 2012). A multi-industry empirical study centralized to purchasing
managers identified trends, methodological challenges, and research gaps from sampled
articles contained published throughout the Journal of Purchasing and Supply
Management (H. Walker et al., 2012).
Engaging in processes of transforming corporate leaders to enhance contributions
to larger sustainable development delivered sustainable value beyond financial growth
(Kiron et al., 2013; Tideman et al., 2013). For some industries, Leadership in Energy and
Environmental Design (LEED) certification programs facilitated this process. One
empirical test assessed factors that influence US companies decisions on adopting LEED
certification programs (Gauthier & Wooldridge, 2012). Publicly available information
provided support for the argument that imagination drives LEED adoption among
organizations (Gauthier & Wooldridge, 2012). Additionally, the work contributed to
investigative literature that determines sustainable innovation adoption (Gauthier &
Wooldridge, 2012). No matter how organizational leaders approach sustainable growth,
the research showed high potential for implementing sustainable programs. Many
company leaders proceed with incorporating sustainability initiatives because resources
and capabilities reside internally; however, the ability to add value may be dependent
upon supporting routines (Perego & Kolk, 2012). Unconventional methods are
organizational leaders’ responsibility to determine the best course forward to achieve
sustainable progress for a company’s future.
Sustainable Procurement
Sustainable procurement appears most frequently defined as the pursuit of
sustainable development objectives through the purchasing and supply chain process (H.
Walker et al., 2012). The most common definition is applicable, as no universal
definition of sustainability or sustainable procurement exists. Sustainable procurement is
a growing phenomenon. Concepts used to explain sustainable supply chain management
will apply to explore sustainablility factors facilitating successful performance in
government contracting (Giunipero, Hooker, & Denslow, 2012; Tate, Ellram, & Dooley,
2012). Initiatives included avoiding cost overruns through contract management through
contractor performance. The exploration of contractor performance may include
minimizing cost overruns through leadership efforts.
Researchers explored performance objectives that included price supporting the
sustainability of upstream supply chains (Ageron, Gunasekaran, & Spalanzani, 2012).
Theoretical frameworks developed for sustainable supply management focused on
suppliers and their firms’ involvement in formulating and managing a sustainable
business. Giunipero et al. (2012) later substantiated the findings of Ageron et al. (2012).
Management initiatives and government regulations primarily dictate purchasing and
supply chain sustainability efforts (Giunipero et al., 2012). A hindrance to sustainability
initiatives for many companies includes investments in sustainability during economic
uncertainty (Giunipero et al., 2012).
Sustainability for organizations includes critical areas that collectively create a
systemic, strategic focus that helps foster sustainable growth for stakeholders and
agencies. It is unclear if business leaders pursue sustainability measures to benefit the
group. For example, environmental purchasing and supplier management are early trends
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for many organizations. Upon initial implementation, external pressure toward
environmental responsibility pressures many organizations to pursue environmental
sustainability (Tate et al., 2012). Executives acknowledge their naivete by reporting
lacking consistency in selecting and implementing sustainability activities at the CEO
level (Giunipero et al., 2012). Researchers have begun to contribute to the literature on
sustainability from a nonfinancial perspective and to devise methods for measuring
sustainable leadership (Lourenço, Callen, Branco, & Curto, 2014). Based on performance
outcomes, sustainable leadership involves the interaction between environmental
performance, social performance, and financial performance (Ameer & Othman, 2012).
Senior leaders tend to capture sustainability policy and practices by adopting dedicated
language and financial auditing processes (Perego & Kolk, 2012). That allows them to
ensure they meet their own commercial and professional objectives through reporting
(Boiral & Gendron, 2011; J. Smith et al., 2011). The questionable reporting alludes to a
trend that organizational leaders will incorporate and report sustainable progress because
for financial gain or to retain stakeholders’ trust.
Performance Measurement and Outcomes in Public Contracting
Government officials maintain past performance reports as a determining factors
in vendor responsibility. Although compliance levels with reporting requirements have
improved, the compliance rates with reporting vary considerably by organization (GAO,
2014). The principal-agent theory has a framework for monitoring various contract
outcomes, which includes performance measurements. The concepts and methods, as
mentioned previously in supply chain management and public procurement, retain
transferability and applicability. A greater goal alignment between public and nonprofit
organizations means that nonprofit organizations leaders can demonstrate high reliability
in performing work for government entities, thereby resulting in a higher effectiveness
level (Awortwi, 2012). Substantial factors discussed involving vendor performance
impacts entangle the government’s close cooperation with its contractors, in addition to
political connections (Lamothe & Lamothe, 2012a). The untraditional relationship
between the government and the contractor aligns with the Awortwi (2012), who
concluded that the most significantly perceived contractual performance indicators are
contractor selection and contract monitoring.
Considering reflected activities and behaviors presented in the principal-agent
relationship, universal, nondiscriminant performance measures exist (Witesman &
Fernandez, 2013). An e-procurement model for public contracting authorities to quantify
procurement performance benefits assisted the industry by measuring how e-procurement
contributed to increasing organizational performance (Gardenal, 2013). Goal alignment is
an important factor in measuring and predicting successful government contractor
performance irrespective the size, company or contract type. Contracting performance is
a byproduct resulting from trade-offs existing between different aspects contained within
the contracting relationship (Awortwi, 2012). In exploring contracting effectiveness and
government’s performance, performance management included a focus on correlations
between various factors the authors selected to investigate (Chaturvedi & Gautam, 2013).
The results framework document process rendered positive impacts on several key highperforming organizations indicators (Chaturvedi & Gautam, 2013). The findings showed
that the initiative had the potential to contribute toward civil servants performance
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orientation. The efforts also helped government agency leaders push specific agendas for
reforms and good governance.
Performance measuring from the government perspective, the rating official
almost invariably relates to principal-agent theory concepts. Recent studies include
discussions on performance within the principal-agent theory context (Awortwi, 2012).
Some addressed performance specifically as it related to government contracting
(Chaturvedi & Gautam, 2013) while others incorporated dynamics such as political
connection impacts on vendor performance (Lamothe & Lamothe, 2012a). All
researchers reviewed independently contributed to the body of knowledge in some form.
When addressing elements focused on answering the central research question, however,
authors failed to specifically addressed sustainability factors in government contractor
performance within the principal-agent theory framework.
Contract Performance Leadership Ramifications
The government sets aside approximately 23% of all contracting dollars to small
businesses. Poor performance ramifications are detrimental to small business participants.
When performance suffers, immediate performance or a contractual agreement breach
occurs (Jacobi & Weiss, 2013). In assessing default remedies for contract breaches, an
economic determination motivates renegotiating the contract, or seeking default remedies
(Jacobi & Weiss, 2013). The decision should encompass allowance for immediate
performance or present a future payment value from court proceedings (Jacobi & Weiss,
2013).
Performance rating implications
Positive performance ratings and contractor performance systems are critical for
continued opportunities for entrepreneurs, as contracting officers seek experienced and
qualified business partners to achieve its objectives (Bradshaw & Chang, 2013). Creating
performance measures has positive implications on the federal decision makers’ capacity
to manage contracts successfully (Amirkhanyan, 2011). These factors make positive
performance an imperative goal for government contractors because a requirement for
increased accountability becomes created by performance measurement (Amirkhanyan,
2011). Multiple findings have shown that the government reporting system and processes
for analyzing and reporting performance lack the capacity to provide effective results
(Amirkhanyan, 2011; Bradshaw & Chang, 2013). Regardless of accuracy, the
information helps government officials determine whether a contractor receives future
work (Bradshaw & Chang, 2013). Notwithstanding the deficiency in performance
reporting, performance reporting is public information once published. The records
become public and are viewable by any interested party. Therefore, a negative impact on
poor performance ratings may extend beyond the lost revenue from government
contracting opportunities. As discussed previously, procurement officials consider past
performance reviews in source selection processes.
Adversarial relationships
Building coalitions with the principal company facilitate positive attributes to
success and align with the principal-agent theory theoretical framework. Sustainability in
procurement supply chain processes includes creating value for multiple stakeholders and
the principal (Latham, 2014). Communication and organizational structure predominantly
influenced mutual relationships that relied heavily on perception (Grudinschi, Sintonen,
& Hallikas, 2014). Collaboration and partnerships are essential to public service
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procurement (Grudinschi et al., 2014). Both variables substantiated and extended the
research conducted by Plane and Green (2012), who concluded that value for both buyers
and suppliers emerges when maintaining a successful collaborative relationship.
While literature exists that helps emphasize the connection between the
government and contractors exists, adverse relationship implications are unclear and
undefined. Contradictory procurement approaches have not necessarily precluded
collaborative relationship maturation (Plane & Green, 2012). Striving to create such a
relationship may prove more valuable to both parties.
Contractual ramifications
Since 2012, suspension or debarment actions in US acquisitions have nearly
doubled (Lasky, 2013). The ramifications for poor performance become critical and
possibly detrimental to business leaders. Potential contract consequences include
suspension or debarment, which are serious matters to small firms. Creating and
implementing comprehensive values-based ethics and compliance program as
recommended is the best way for government contractors to avoid suspensions and
debarment (Lasky, 2013). Other statutory powers available to the government for
implementation against underperforming contractors include terminations. Terminations
for convenience under a traditional fixed-price contract allow the government to breach
contract terms legally when it benefits the government (Korman, 2014). The legal breach
subsequently entitles the contractor to recover certain costs (Korman, 2014). However,
terminations for default become available for enforcement when a contractor defaults on
a contractual agreement between the parties. In terminations for default, the contractor
becomes liable for assessed claims for replacement products, price increases, and
administrative costs (GAO, 1994). Small firm performance has been weaker throughout
the recent economic recovery than during any other recovery since 1973 (Chow &
Dunkelberg, 2011). The financial repercussions to terminations usually mean the
difference between small business growth or death.
DISCUSSION
Themes revealed included leadership’s role in (a) building collaborative working
relationships, (b) aligning goals with the principal (government) to create value for both
parties, and (c) implementing actions to create long-term value and growth. The content
within the themes selected included recent study reviews to address each critical research
elements.
Sustainability Defined and Applied to Government Contracting
With the paucity of research on strategies for sustainability in government
contracts, the articles selected, taken mutually offered theories and concepts to get closer
to a single definition of sustainability in government contracting. Sustainability in
government contracting is reflective of initiatives included avoiding cost overruns
through contract management through contractor performance leading to reduced costs
and value creation for multiple stakeholders and the principal (Giunipero et al., 2012;
Latham, 2014). What was uncovered may be revered as concepts of how to further the
discussion on sustainability in government contracting. Through the lens of principalagent theory to government contractors achieve sustainability through manage risks, align
incentives, and forge relationships (Fayezi, O’Loughlin, & Zutshi, 2012) to enhance
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financial performance improve economic benefits, enhancing relevant organizational
aspects and ultimately creating value for multiple stakeholders and the principal (Latham,
2014; Lee & Pati, 2012).
Concepts of Sustainability, Government Contracting, and Contractor Performance
Practitioners may strive for this value creation through trade-offs existing between
different aspects contained within the contracting relationship effectiveness and its
impact on improving government’s performance (Awortwi, 2012) thereby creating longterm successful performance. Elements idenfified fall within the categories of social,
political, economic, ethical practices, and customer concern sustainability related
requirements. The goal for government contractors becomes the ability to exibit social,
political, economic, ethical practices, and customer concern within the contexts of
aligning goals, managing risks and forging relationships to build effective relationships.
The formula may increase value to the government and sustainability in terms of
contractor longevity through superior contractor performance.
Limitations and Recommendations for Further Research
The fact that service delivery among local United States governments may differ
(Witesman & Fernandez, 2013) creates a limitation that findings may constrain
generalizability. Government contracting is a vast field; therefore, results as applied to
one industry may not be generalizable to all sectors. Available information may not
include insight into applicability among the varying contract types that exist. Finally,
limited information on variables critical to the study created limitations for a thorough
qualitative discussion pertaining to current literature. A larger scale exploratory study of
the specific contract types and sustainable practices that facilitate success may further
assist business leaders that perform within specific industries. Sustainability implies longterm practices and measurements of performance. The current study omits consideration
for any period for success measurement. Exploring actual successful practices over a
significant period, a case study may capture a long-term perspective of the impact of
sustainability on long-term strategic planning organizations. The foundation of the
research arose from the gap in literature in the budding field of government contracts
particularly sustainability in government contracts. Future research examining actual
variables through a qualitative or mixed method correlation study identify then measuring
sustainability factors and contract performance may address this limitation.
CONCLUSIONS
Government contracting positions as a significant contributor to achieving
sustainable development and continues to gain positive initiatives towards this
development in other countries (Melissen, & Reinders, 2012). History contributes to
sustainable change by creating mechanisms for feedback available to employ variations
of future organizational practices (Prywes, 2011). The information provided through this
research provides practitioners with a view of successful practices to employ in future
attempts First, leaders and managers should recognize available sustainable practices and
distinguish how they differ from their current behaviors. Second, leaders and managers
should asses the advantages and disadvantages of incorporating resources into daily
business functions. Lastly, leaders and managers should develop a strategic plan for
implementing any contemplated changes that includes training and education for
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successful practical application. Literature on sustainability in government contracts,
evaluated individually did not offer a clear solution to the central research question.
However, when assessing correlated theories collectively a framework to extend the
research through further inquiry emerges. Sustainability in the US governmentcontracting arena largely remains unclearly defined when discussing roles, definitions,
and performance measurements. This study offers viable evidence to leaders and
managers who serve as strategic decision makers within their organizations.
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